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INTRODUCTION

Those concerned with the progress of human rights' have reason
to be discouraged and apprehensive today. Recent events raise doubts

about the status of human rights. Certainly by many standards, the
condition of mankind has improved since ancient times, but large scale
social control and technological advancements have increased our ability to inflict violence and oppression. The atrocities of the Second
World War and the recent genocide in Southeast Asia are memorable

low points in mankind's history and give good reason to question the
"progress" of modern man. The campaign for human rights, because

1. An explicit delineation of the many rights included in the term "human rights" is
not necessary or feasible for the purposes of this Note. Except where otherwise noted, the
term is used to include the many rights referred to in the various international declarations,
e.g., U.N. CHARTER, including references in the Preamble; art. 1, para. 3; art. 13, para. l(b);
art. 55; art. 56; art. 62, para. 2; art. 68; art. 76(c). See also Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) [hereinafter cited as UDHR]; International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A, 21 U.N. GAOR,
Supp. (No. 16) 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967); International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 49, 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967);
(European) Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221; International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Racial Discrimination, enteredintoforce Jan. 4, 1969, 660 U.N.T.S. 195; American Convention on Human Rights, O.A.S. Doc. OEA/SER. K/XVI/1.1 Doc. 65 (1970).
For a general discussion of the historical and modern meanings of "human rights" see
L. HENKIN, THE RIGHTS OF MAN TODAY (1978); V. VAN DYKE, HUMAN RIGHTS, THE
UNITED STATES AND THE WORLD CoMMuNITY, 9-102 (1970); M. CRANSTON, WHAT ARE
HUMAN RIGHTS?

(1962).
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of its concern with the condition of the individual and its implications
for world peace, deserves and requires the full commitment of social
resources. As is true in many areas of social development, the legal
profession is in a special position to effect change in human rights.
Human rights have undergone substantial change since the Second
World War, largely at the hands of international lawyers. A new consciousness of the international community is reflected in two developments which have radically transformed international law: (1) a
proliferation of international treaties dealing with the protection of
human rights,2 and (2) the vesting of the individual with sufficient in-3
ternational legal character to make him a subject of international law.
Under international law during the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, the individual had no cognizable rights or duties; the individual was not considered a possible subject of international law.4 Now

the individual is the focus of many international human rights instruments, some of which subject the individual to personal liability and
provide for personal remedies.5
However, in many respects this "transformation" has proved illu2. See, eg., treaties, conventions, and covenants listed supra note 1. For a list of all
human rights documents on deposit with the Secretary-General of the United Nations
through 1977 including signatures and ratifications, see I J. JoYcE, HUMAN RIGHTS; INTERNATIONAL DocUMENTs 518-23 (1978).
3. The vesting of individuals with international legal character is one of the most
profound developments in modern international law. Originally, the "law of nations" did
not distinguish between individuals and states, or public and private rights or duties. See
Dickinson, The Law ofNations as Part ofthe NationalLaw of the UnitedStates, 101 U. PA.
L. REv.26, 27 (1952). However, during the 19th century, a restrictive conception of international law developed, which has been labelled the "classical system" of international law.
(Blum & Steinhardt, FederalAurisdiction over InternationalHuman Rights Clains: The .4lien
Tort Claims Act after Filarigav. Pena-Irala,22 HARV. IN'L L. J. 53, 64 (1981)) or the
"conservative approach" to international law (Note, Towardan InternationalLawofHuman
Rights Basedupon the Mutual Expectationsof States, 21 VA. J. IN'TL L. 185, 190 (1980)).
This approach, based on the absolute sovereignty of states, held that the individual was
neither subject to, not directly protected by, international law. See Humphrey, The International Law of Human Rights in the Middle Twentieth Century, in THE PRESENT STATE OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 75, 76 (M. Bas ed. 1973)..
The Second World War forced the world community to realize that human rights violations, aside from their inherent injustice, are a grave source of international instability.
Thus, human rights violations were brought out of the closet of solely "domestil jurisdiction" and exposed to the light of international scrutiny. This shift in focus of international
law is no less than revolutionary. Id at 83. See also P. CoRBET, THE GROWTH OF WORLD
LAW (1971); Tucker, Has the IndividualBecome the Subject olnternational
Law?, 34 U. CiN.
L. REv. 341 (1965); .Brownlie, he Place of the Individual inInternationalLaw, 50 VA. L.
Rnv. 435 (1964).
4. See Humphrey, supra note 3, at 76.
5. Id at83.
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sory. International law remains a simple social structure; it lacks the
centralized sanctioning authority and secondary rule of recognition6
characteristic of the municipal law of more mature social systems.

Much of the "law" of the international community appears impotent
when evaluated on the basis of criteria normally applied to municipal
law. More and more we must confront "a partially fictitious legal universe saturated with treaties that are in force but are in fact ineffective.
International law [is] departing from reality, and, therefore, losing
credibility." 7

While human rights are no longer solely within the domestic jurisdiction of sovereign states, a centralized sanctioning authority to enforce their protection via international law is still lacking.' Almost the
only time that international human rights provisions are given the effect of municipal law is when states choose to implement them domestically and apply domestic sanctions.
The United States has conspicuously failed to do this. The United

States was one of the leaders in the initial development of international
human rights law after the Second World War, 9 but is party to relatively few international human rights treaties, 10 and has generally re-

fused to implement those that it has joined."

The result is a poor

United States record for developing human rights law. Despite the

Reagan administration's recent shift toward a "hands-ofi' policy toward human rights development, there remains a presently effective
and potentially powerful means for accomplishing this end.' 2
6. See H.L.A. HART,THE CONCEPT OF LAW 208-31 (1961). It is possible that international law has begun to develop a basic secondary rule of recognition, providing general
criteria of validity for the rule of international law. Id at 231. See also Topco/Libya Arbitration Case, 104 JOURNAL Du DRorr INTERNATIONAL 350 (1977); Schweber, Confrontation,
Consensus, and Codcation, Address to the American Branch of the International Law
Ass'n (Nov. 3, 1978).
7. Paolillo, Some GeneralReections on the Acceptance of Treatiesas a Means of Expandingthe Body of InternationalLaw, 10 J.INT'L L. & EcoN. 355, 368 (1974).
8. The European Court of Human Rights, to the extent that it serves as a central sanctioning authority for states that are party to the European Human Rights Convention, is an
exception to this statement. See Hoffman, Implementation of InternationalInstruments on
Human Rights, 1959 AM. SOc'Y OF INT'L L. PRoc. 235, 239-40.
9. See Rusk, A PersonalReection on International Covenants on Human Rt'hts, 9
HOFSTRA L. REV. 515 (1981).
10. The United States is a party to 13 international human rights instruments, 12 of
which are listed in Blum & Steinhardt, supra note 3, at 65. The 13th is the UDHR, supra
note 1.
11. The record of the United States regarding the implementation of human rights treaties is largely a result of its legal position on the self-executing status of treaties. See sections
I,IV infra.
12. The United States is not a party to 12 international human rights instruments, listed
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International human fights law, both treaty and customary, can be
used as authority in United States courts to varying extents, and undei
some circumstances can be a source of domestically enforceable rights.
The latter application has been made in several significant recent
cases, 13 and more cases are presently working their way through the
United States court system. 4 Attorneys will want to be aware of this
developing area of the law, as the opportunity to make a profound impact on the nature of international human rights law is now before us.
This Note will begin by exploring the ways in which international
human rights law may be recognized as authority in United States
courts. It will then focus upon the extent to which the United Nations
Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights have been
given legal force. Judicial recognition of the evolved character of international law in the case of Filartiga v. Pena Irala will be discussed.
Section I will consider the troublesome concept of self-executing
treaty analysis and evaluate the cases that have applied this analysis to
the U.N. Charter and the UDHR. The concluding section will reevaluate the self-executing treaty analysis and advocate its revision in light
of the changed character of international law.

H. RECENT PROGRESS IN THE DOMESTIC
APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS LAW
The cases discussed in this section demonstrate a number of ways

in which international law may be recognized as authority in United
in Blum & Steinhardt, supra note 3, at 65. On the policies of the current administration, see
generally Cohen, Wrong on Human Rights, NEw REPtBLIC, March 28, 1981, at 13. The role
of human rights in the foreign policy of the current administration is revealed in this statement by U.N. Ambassador Jean Fitzpatrick: "[tihe central goal of our foreign policy should
be not the moral elevation of other nations, but the preservation of a civilized conception of
our own national self interest." Interview, U.S. NEws & WORLD REPORT, March 2, 1981, at
59-60.
-i
13. See section II infra.
14. One of the most interesting cases is Crockett v. Reagan, No. 81-1034 (D.D.C., filed'
May 1, 1981), recently brought by Congressman George W. Crockett, Jr. and 23 other members of Congress against President Reagan, Secretary of State Haig, and Secretary of Defense Weinberger. The case was assigned to Judge Joyce Green, who also wrote the
opinions in Leteler v. Chile (discussed at text accompanying notes 44-61) and Hanoch TelOren v. Libyan People'sRepublic (discussed at text accompanying notes 164-86 infra). Plaintiffs seek an order requiring the withdrawal of U.S. armed forces from El Salvador, and the
ending of all military aid to the ruling junta there. Liability is alleged under article I, section
8, clause 11 of the U.S..Constitution, the War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-48
(1973), and the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 22 U.S.C. § 2304, as amended Pub. L. 96-53,
tit. V, § 511, 93 Stat. 380; Pub. L. 96-92 § 4, 93 Stat. 702 (1979).
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States courts. In general, there are two primary sources for this authority: the common law and the United States Constitution.
Regarding the common law, it has been said that "[iut is an ancient
and a salutary feature of the Anglo-American legal tradition that the
Law of Nations is a part of the law of the land to be ascertained and
administered, like any other, in the appropriate case."' 5 This tenet of
our common law heritage is also reflected in article VI. paragraph two
of the United States Constitution:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound

in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding.
While these principles appear strong and unequivocal, their application has been weak and ambiguous. As will be seen, the role of international law within the domestic legal framework is unclear.
Numerous tensions exist between the authority of domestic (or municipal) law based on Anglo-American traditions and the authority of international law based on broader, world-wide consensus. Changing
conceptions of the nature of international law have exacerbated these
tensions.
Due to the uncertainties in this area, systematic application of international law within the domestic legal framework is lacking. Numerous legal impediments have been developed that may be thrown in the
path of advocates invoking international law in domestic courts, e.g.
standing to sue and other abstention-oriented requirements. 16 Some
hurdles, such as the political question and sovereign immunity doc17
trines, take on a stricter character when applied to international law.
Other hurdles are unique to international law, such as the Act of State
thereby, any Thing

15. Dickinson, supra note 3, at 26. See also The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700

(1900).
16. For a discussion of standing requirements applied in cases involving international
human rights law, see Note, Individual Enforcement of ObligationsAlrising under the United
Nations Charter, 19 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 195 (1979); Note, FederalCourts Lack Subject
MatterJurisdictionto Adjudicate Claims 4rising Out of U.N. Security CouncilResolutions, 24
KAN. L. Rav. 395, 397-98 (1976); Stavis, Standingto Sue: Diggs v. Secretaryof Treasury and
Union Carbide Corporation, 30 GUILD PRACTITIONER 102 (1973).
17. For a discussion of the expanded role of the political question doctrine in international law cases, see L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 210-16 (1972).
For a discussion of the sovereign immunity doctrine and its applications in our horizontal
legal order, see R. FALK, THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC CouRTs IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
ORDER 139 (1964).
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doctrine and self-executing treaty analysis." This panoply of judicial
options, combined with a relatively small number of case applications,
results in divergent and often conflicting holdings.
A. International Human Rights Law as a Standard for Domestic
Constitutional Norms
It has often been said that the framers of the United States Constitution showed tremendous foresight in leaving its terms broad and
vague.19 The indefinite terms of the Constitution represent far more
than the lowest common denominator at the Constitutional Convention; they reflect the conviction of the founders that the Constitution
should be a living document, able to grow and change with an evolving
society. Justice Frankfurter stated that fundamental constitutional concepts such as due process and equal protection are not "final and fixed"
but evolve on the basis of judgments "reconciling the needs both of
continuity and of change in a progressive society."' 20 An important
question arises as to what sources and standards should be considered
in evaluating the evolving meaning of these concepts. The answer remains open.
In the early days of the American Republic, when there were comparatively few domestic sources for national policy, courts readily utilized views from abroad to interpret phrases and to define accepted
norms. 2 1 It has been suggested that as domestic authority became more
abundant, courts tended to rely less on international sources. This
tendency was reinforced by a restrictive conception of international
law, sometimes termed the classical system of international law, which
took hold in the late nineteenth century and became predominant by
1900.23
Concepts of international law changed, and so did the readiness of
18. For a discussion of the Act of State doctrine, see Henkin, The ForeignAffairs Power
ofthe Federal Courts: Sabbatino, 64 COLUM. L. REv. 805 (1964); Henkin, Act of State Today: Recollections in Tranquility, 6 COLUM. J.TRANSNAT'L L. 175 (1967); R. FALK, supra
note 17, at 64-138; discussion of Letelier v. Republic of Chile, at text accompanying notes
44-61 infra. Self-executing treaty analysis is discussed in sections III and IV of this Note,
infra.
19. See, eg., E.S. CORWiN, THE DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW, ITS LEGAL AND HisTORICAL BASIS, AND OTHER ESSAYS (1914).
20. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 170-72 (1952).
21. See, e.g., United States v. La Jeune Eugenie, 26 F. Cas. 832, 841 (C.C.D. Mass.
1822). See also Wright, NationalCourtsandHuman Rights-The Fujii Case, 45 Am. LITr'L
L. 62, 81 (1951).
22. Wright, supra note 21, at 81.
23. See Blum & Steinhardt, supra note 3, at 64. See also discussion in note 3, supra.

Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review

[Vol 5

the judiciary to evaluate constitutional norms in light of international
standards. With the classical conception of international law on the
wane by the middle of this century, Justice Frankfurter was willing to
define due process on the basis of "standards of decency more or less
universally accepted."' 4 By the end of the Second World War, courts

were again looking to international standards in interpreting constitutional norms, especially when evaluating those norms in light of national policy.25 One of the most prominent examples of judicial
cognizance of international human rights norms came in the case of
Oyama v. Calfornia.26
The Oyama case dealt with the California Alien Land Law, a state

statute that clearly discriminated on the basis of race.2 7 In holding this
law contrary to the fourteenth amendment, four Justices of the
Supreme Court invoked the United Nations Charter in their concurring opinions. Justices Black and Douglas reasoned:
[W]e have recently pledged ourselves to cooperate with the United
Nations to 'promote. . . universal respect for, and observance of,
human rights and fundamental freedom for all without distinction as
to race, sex, language, or religion.' How can this nation be faithful to
this international pledge if state laws which bar land ownership and
occupancy28 by aliens on account of race are permitted to be
enforced?
24. Louisiana ex rel Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 469 (1947) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
25. See, e.g., Namba v. McCourt, 185 Or. 579, 603, 204 P.2d 569, 579 (1949); Perez v,
Sharp, 32 Cal. 2d 711, 198 P.2d 17 (1948).
26. 332 U.S. 633 (1947).
27. 1 Deering's Gen. Laws, Act 261 (1945). The pertinent portions read as follows:
§ 1. All aliens eligible to citizenship under the laws of the United States may acquire, possess, enjoy, use, cultivate, occupy, transfer, transmit and inherit real
property, or any interest therein, in this state, and have in whole or in part the
beneficial use thereof, in the same manner and to the same extent as citizens of the
United States, except as otherwise provided by the laws of this state.
§ 2. All aliens other than those mentioned in section one of this act may acquire,
possess, enjoy, use, cultivate, occupy and transfer real property, or any interest
therein, in this state, and have in whole or in part the beneficial use thereof, in the
manner and to the extent, and for the purposes prescribed by any treaty now existing between the government of the United States and the nation or country of
which such alien is a citizen or subject, and not otherwise. ...
§ 7. Al' real property hereafter acquired in fee in violation of the provisions of
this act by any alien mentioned in Section 2 of this act, ... shall escheat as of the
date of such acquiring, to, and become and remain the property of the state of
California....
28. 332 U.S. at 649-50.
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Justice Murphy, joined by Justice Rutledge, citing the same pledge,
stated:
The Alien Land Law stands as a barrier to the fulfillment of that
national pledge. Its consistency with the Charter, which has been
is but one more readuly ratified and adopted by the United States,
29
son why the statute must be condemned.
In two more recent cases, declarations of international human
rights standards were applied in purely domestic contexts, to define due
process. The first, Sterling v. Cupp,30 was brought by male inmates of
the Oregon State Penitentiary to enjoin prison officials from assigning
female correctional personnel to duties that involved frisks or patdowns
of male prisoners. In support of its holding that the challenged activity
violated state constitutional norms, the Oregon Supreme Court looked
to international human rights law as a standard of measure:
Indeed, the same principles have been a worldwide concern recognized by the United Nations and other multinational bodies. The
various formulations in these different sources in themselves are not
constitutional law. We cite them here as contemporary expressions
of the same concern with minimizing needlessly harsh, degrading, or
dehumanizing treatment of prisoners that is expressed in article I,
section 13 [of the Oregon Constitution]. 3 '
The second case, Lareau v. Mfanson,32 was brought by inmates of a
Connecticut prison against prison officials. The inmates claimed that
conditions and procedures at the prison violated both the eighth
amendment duty to provide adequate housing for convicted inmates
and the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. The court
held that the conditions under challenge violated the inmates' due process rights,33 noting that prison conditions left many of the inmates
with approximately one-half as much space as is prescribed as minimally acceptable by generally recognized correctional standards.3 4 In
an exhaustive footnote,3 5 the court set out some of the generally recognized standards, including the United Nations Standard Minimum
Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners.3 6 The U.N. standards had been
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
Crime

Id at 673.
625 P.2d 123 (1981).
Id at 131.
507 F. Supp. 1177 (D. Conn. 1980).
Id at 1190.
Id at 1187.
Id at 1187 n.9.
Adopted Aug. 30, 1955, by the First United Nations Congress on the Prevention of
and the Treatment of Offenders, U.N. Doc. A/CONF./6/1, Annex I, A (1956);
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expressly adopted as the "Preamble to the Administrative Directives of
the Connecticut Department of Correction" by the defendant department in 1974.37
The Lareau court, however, considered the Standard Minimum
Rules as having a significance far beyond the mere fact that the Connecticut administration had adopted them. The court noted that Justice Rehnquist had stated that such standards "may be instructive in
certain cases."" The court cited Filartigav. Pena-Iralafor the proposition that the standards:
may be significant as expressions of the obligations to the international community of the member states of the United Nations...
and as part of the body of international law (including customary
been built
international law) concerning human rights which 3has
9
upon the foundation of the United Nations Charter.
The court also observed the "well established [principle] that customary international law is part of the law -of the United States."'
The
court recognized that the Standard Minimum Rules were adopted by
the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations in accordance
with the Council's mandate under article 62(2) of the Charter,4 1 and
noted the leading role played by the United States in these
developments.4 2
In concluding its incisive footnote, the court observed that all of
these facts did not necessarily render the United Nations Standard
Minimum Rules applicable in the case before it. Nonetheless the court
stated:
[T]hese actions constitute an authoritative international statement of
basic norms of human dignity and of certain practices which are repugnant to the conscience of mankind. The standards embodied in
this statement are relevant to the 'canons of decency and fairness
which express the notions of justice' embodied in the Due Process
adopted July 31, 1957, by the Economicand Social Council, E.S.C. Res. 663C (XX1V), 24
U.N. ESCOR, Supp. (No. 1) 11, U.N. Doc. E/3048 (1957).
37. 507 F. Supp. at 1187 n.9.
38. Id (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 544 n.27 (1979)).
39. 507 F. Supp. at 1188 n.9. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) is
discussed at text accompanying notes 99-129 infra.
40. 507 F. Supp. at 1188 n.9 (citing the Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900), and

L. HENKIN, supra note 17, at 221).
41. The Economic and Social Council is authorized to "make recommendations for the
purpose of promoting respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental free-

doms for all." U.N.

CHARTER

art. 62(2).

42. 507 F. Supp. at 1188 n.9.

International Human Rights
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Clause.

B. Letelier v. Republic of Chile": Jurisdiction over Foreign States
for Tortious Violations of International Law
The Letelier case was brought by the survivors of Orlando Letelier, a Chilean dissident leader4 5 assassinated in the United States in
1976, and by the survivors of an American, Ronni Moffitt, also killed in

the assassination. The Republic of Chile, an American resident of
Chile, and several members of an anti-Castro Cuban exile group were
named as defendants. The individuals allegedly acted at the direction
of the intelligence agency of the Chilean government. 4 6 The plaintiffs
alleged five causes of action arising out of the assassination, including
"tortious activities in violation of the law of nations resulting in death
to Orlando Letelier and Ronni Moffitt." 47
The Letelier case was decided in two opinions, both written by
Judge Joyce Hens Green of the District Court for the District of Columbia. 48 The Chilean government refused to enter a formal appearance through counsel, but communicated, by diplomatic notes relayed

through the State Department, its view that the court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction.49 A default judgment was entered against the Chilean government. The only legal issues discussed in any detail in the

opinions relate to the jurisdictional question.5"
Jurisdiction was granted "pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1331,

43. Id (citing Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169 (1952)).
44. 488 F. Supp. 665 (D.D.C. 1980), 502 F. Supp. 259 (D.D.C. 1980).
45. The target of the assassination, Orlando Letelier, had been a prominent figure in the
Chilean government during the Allende administration, serving as Ambassador to the
United States, Minister of Foreign Relations, Minister of Interior, and finally as Minister of
Defense. When the Pinochet regime came to power in September of 1973, Letelier was first
imprisoned and eventually expelled from Chile. Upon immigrating to the United States,
Letelier served as Director of the Transnational Program at the Institute for Policy Studies
in Washington, D.C., and taught at a local university. He was a prominent critic of the
Chilean military junta headed by President Pinochet. 502 F. Supp. at 264-65.
46. Originally, the intelligence organ (Centro Nacional de Informaciones) and several
additional individuals were named as defendants. For various reasons, and with plaintiffs'
acquiescence, these defendants were dismissed without prejudice. 502 F. Supp. at 261 n.2.
47. Id at 260 n.l.
48. The first opinion held that the court properly had jurisdiction over the case. 488 F.
Supp. 665 (D.D.C. 1980). The second opinion held that judgment by default and damages
were appropriate. 502 F. Supp. 259 (D.D.C. 1980).
49. 488 F. Supp. at 667-68.
50. For a plaintiff to be able to secure a default judgment under the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act, he must establish his claim by evidence satisfactory to the court. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1608(e) (1976).
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1332(a)(3), 1343(l)-(2), 1350 and the doctrines of pendent and ancillary
jurisdiction."' 51 Judge Green construed defendant's diplomatic notes to
the court as a "suggestion" that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.5 2 The judge addressed the jurisdictional issues, including the defenses of sovereign immunity and Act of State.
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act was passed by Congress in
1976 in an effort to introduce uniformity to sovereign immunity determinations by transferring responsibility for such decisions from the executive branch to the judiciary, thereby reducing the foreign policy
implications of the decisions. The Act specifies categories of actions for
which foreign states are not entitled to claim sovereign immunity from
the jurisdiction of American courts. 3
One such category covers cases "in which money damages are
sought. . . for personal injury or death, or damage to or loss of property, occurring in the United States and caused by the tortious act or
omission of that foreign state or of any official or employee of that
foreign state. . . ."' Chile maintained that this category was not
meant to include political, tortious acts of a government, but merely
those formerly classified a,, private or commercial ('ure gestionis).55
Judge Green rejected this a:gument, stating that the plain meaning of
the statute included such tortious acts as political assassination, and
that nothing in the legislative history contradicts or qualifies the plain
meaning. 56
Chile also claimed that the Act of State doctrine excused it from
the court's jurisdiction. The classic formulation of the Act of State doctrine was stated by the Supreme Court in Underhill v. Hernandez:
Every sovereign state is bound to respect the independence of every
other sovereign state, and the courts of one country will not sit in
judgment on the acts of the government of another done within its
own territory. Redress of grievances by reason of such acts must be
obtained through the means open to be availed of by sovereign pow51. 502 F. Supp. at 266.
52. 488 F. Supp. at 667.
53. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602, 1605, 1607 (1976); H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 7
(1976), reprintedin [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.NEws 6604; S.REP. No. 94-1310, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1976).
54. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5) (1976).
55. The classification of acts of a state as public (lure imperfl) or private (lure geslionis)
was a determinative characteristic in sovereign immunity cases prior to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, and was clearly articulated in a letter by Jack Tate, Legal Advisor to
the State Department. See 26 DEP'T STATE BULL. 984 (1952).
56. 488 F. Supp. at 671-72.
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ers as between themselves. 57

Chile argued that the acts allegedly taken to assassinate Letelier
therefore were entitled to
were carried out within Chile's borders and
immunity under the Act of State doctrine.5" Judge Green rejected this
argument for two reasons. First, the alleged actions of Chile's agents
resulted in tortious injury within this country. Second, to allow the Act
of State doctrine to be used in this fashion "would totally emasculate
the purpose and effectiveness of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act" by allowing a state to reimpose the pre-Act framework of sovereign immunity under the guise of the Act of State doctrine.5 9
Having established jurisidictional grounds, Judge Green in her
second opinion turned to the question of whether a judgment by- default for the five causes of action was in order. Judge Green found that
plaintiffs had produced satisfactory evidence to establish two of the
causes of action against the Republic of Chile, but not as to the cause of
action based on violation of international law. 60 Conversely, all five
causes of action were affirmed as against the individually named defendants." Judge Green awarded substantial damages for pain and
suffering and wrongful death against all defendants, $2,000,000 in punitive damages against the individually named defendants, and
awarded both expenses and substantial attorneys fees to the plaintiffs.
C. Alien Children Education Cases: Federal Preemption of
Fundamental Human Rights Standards?
The State of Texas enacted a statute denying public education to
children who are neither United States citizens nor legally admitted
aliens.62 When various independent school districts in Texas began enforcing the law in the middle and late seventies, a number of suits were
filed to challenge the statute. Two of these cases, Doe v. Ply/er and In
re Alien Children Education Litigation, were brought in federal district
courts in Texas and have been consolidated for review by the United
States Supreme Court. 3 These two suits challenged the statute on five
57. 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897).
58. 488 F. Supp. at 266.
59. Id
60. 502 F. Supp. at 266.
61. Id
62. Tax. EDUC. CODE (Vernon Supp. 1976) § 21.031.
63. Doe v. Plyler, 628 F.2d 448 (5th Cir. 1980), aft'g 458 F. Supp. 569 (E.D. Texas
1978); In re Alien Children Education Litigation, 501 F. Supp. 544 (S.D. Texas 1980),prob.
fjirs noted,- U.S. -. 101 S. Ct. 3078 (1981).
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different grounds, including some especially imaginative theories:
domestic constitutional guarantees of
(1) that the statute violated
64
equal protection,
(2) that the statute was in conflict with self-executing provisions of
and the Charter of the Organization-ofAmerithe U.N. Charter
65
can States,

66
(3) that it was in violation of customary international law,
(4) that it was contrary to federal policies, both foreign and domestic, that deal with the human rights of 67aliens and is therefore
preempted under the supremacy clause,
with the fed(5) that the statute was an impermissible interference
68
powers.
affairs
foreign
government's
eral

Both district courts held the law to be invalid on the basis of equal
protection.69 While one district court also held that the state law was
invalid under the preemption doctrine,7 ° this theory and all of the other
alternative grounds were rejected by the other district court.7 '
The preemption doctrine, based on article VI of the United States
Constitution, holds that any state legislation which improperly encroaches upon an area of federal responsibility or concern will be held
invalid. 72 The doctrine has been applied to invalidate both state regulation of matters subject to exclusive federal power, such as foreign relations,73 and state regulation that conflicts with the effectuation of
congressional objectives.74
In the alien education cases, the Texas statute was alleged to conflict with federal policy in the areas of immigration and foreign affairs. 75 Both immigration and foreign affairs are said to be areas of
exclusive federal power;7 6 therefore, states should be precluded from
regulating those fields. However, because the leading precedents effec64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
power).
power).

458 F. Supp. at 578-80; 501 F. Supp. at 583-84.
501 F. Supp. at 589-90. See also general discussion in section III of this Note, infra.
501 F. Supp. at 595-96.
458 F. Supp. at 590-92; 501 F. Supp. at 584-88.
501 F. Supp. at 590-95.
458 F. Supp. at 593; 501 F. Supp. at 583-84.
458 F. Supp. at 590-92.
501 F. Supp. at 589-96.
See 501 F. Supp. at 584.
See Comment, 16 Hous. L. REv. 667, 693 (1979), citedin 501 F. Supp. at 584, n.107.
See, e.g., Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
458 F. Supp. at 590-92; 501 F. Supp. at 584-95.
DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976) (immigration is area of exclusive federal
Zschemig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968) (foreign policy is area of exclusive federal
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tively allow for considerable state activity in each of these "exclusivefederal fields, 7 7 the preemption argument in the alien education cases
was also based upon the premise that the statute conflicted with the
aims of federal policies in these areas.
The district court in Doe v. Pvlyer agreed with the preemption argument.78 The court reviewed various federal laws regarding immigration and educational opportunity and noted that "federal laws
consistently demonstrate a strong congressional commitment to education, in particular the education of disadvantaged children." 79 The
court quoted the Charter of the Organization of American States
(OAS), which provides that member states "wini exert the greatest efforts," in accordance with their constitutional powers, to extend educational opportunity to all.80 The court concluded:
While none of these federal laws or policies precisely and expressly
prohibits the state conduct complained of in this case, that is not dispositive of the preemption challenge, '[f]or when the. question is
whether a federal act overrides a state law, the entire scheme of the
statute must.., be considered, and that which needs must be implied is of no less force than that which is expressed.' Savage v.
Jones, 225 U.S. 501, 533 (1912). The Texas statute challenged here
defeats the clear implications of federal laws covering both illegal
aliens and education of disadvantaged children."
The other Texas district court and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed with the preemption argument. The district court, in In
re Alien Children Education Litigation, looked solely to title I of the
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 in assessing federal
policy regarding educational opportunity. While recognizing that title
I represents a strong congressional commitment to educational opportunity, especially for low income and migratory agricultural workers'
children,8 2 and that the Act makes no distinction between documented
and undocumented workers 3 and is specifically designed to benefit
substantial numbers of undocumented children, 4 the court nonetheless
77. 424 U.S. at 355 (not every state enactment dealing with aliens is a regulation of
immigration, and state regulations harmonious with federal aims are allowable); New York
Dep't of Social Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 423 n.29 (1973).
78. 458 F. Supp. at 590-92.
79. Id at 591.
80. Id at 592 (citing 21 U.S.T. 607, T.I.A.S. No. 6847, 721 U.N.T.S. 324 (1970)).
81. 458 F. Supp. at 592.
82. 501 F. Supp. at 584-88.
83. Id at 585.
84. Id at 586.
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concluded that the Texas statute denying education to undocumented
children does not stand "as an obstacle to the accomplishment and exe.
cution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress ...
"the
perceived
that
concluded
of
Appeals
Court
Fifth
Circuit
The
conflicts are at most illusory and that [the Texas statute] does not conflict with federal policy."8 6 The court- conceded, however, that
"[p]laintiffs' position is plausible, though not persuasive. Indeed, Congress may have intended to ensure a free education to all children
within the United States. But we find no evidence that this was the
express or implied intent of Congress. ... "'
The district court in In re Alien Children Education Litigation also
rejected the claim based on impermissible state interference with the
foreign affairs power. In considering this theory, the court first observed the "waning of the nation-state" in the twentieth century and
the concomitant "internationalization of human rights."8 8 The court
noted numerous provisions of the U.N. Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the OAS Charter, and other international
human rights instruments which establish the right to free education.8 9
While the court stated that these provisions are not necessarily selfexecuting, they nonetheless constitute federal foreign policy commitments technically capable of ousting inconsistent state law. 90 The court
stated that the question of whether such federal activity overrides inconsistent state laws should be resolved "by construing the intent of
those who signed or ratified [the instruments]." 9 1
The district court concluded that the United States officials who
participated in the negotiation of these instruments did not intend to
oust inconsistent state laws,92 and that the prescriptive and normative
content of the provisions is of no preemptive force.93 As a result, state
interference with the obligation to promote the right to free education
was held not to constitute interference with foreign policy. 4
85. Id
86. 628 F.2d at 453.
87. Id at 454 (citing Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501, 533 (1912)).
88. 501 F. Supp. at 590 (citing Murphy, Childrenof the Eighth Day: The Role ofInternational Lawyers in a Post-Modern World, 13 INT'L LAw. 681, 684-85 (1979)).
89. 501 F. Supp. at 591-94.
90. Id at 591.
91. Id No authority is cited to support this method of analysis; the court's analysis
appears to be novel.
92. Id at 592-94.
93. Id at 591.
94. Id at 593.
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Many of the assumptions underlying the court's conclusions in
Alien Children Education are unclear. The court's assertion that state
interference with international obligations is permissible seems to rely
on dicta by Justice Stewart that "shifting winds at the State Department cannot control whether a particular state statute is in conflict with
the United States conduct of foreign relations."95 Such reasoning is
particularly inappropriate when applied to the three international obligations that the court considered: the U.N. Charter, the UDHR, and
the OAS Charter. These commitments cannot be characterized as
"shifting winds."
The district court's holding that the intent of the federal actors
who contracted our international obligations should determine whether
those obligations override conflicting state action is more troubling.
This approach apparently equates self-executing treaty analysis with
the doctrine of exclusive federal authority over the conduct of foreign
relations. Self-executing treaty analysis attempts to determine when
private litigants may claim enforceable rights under a treaty. 96 The
doctrine of exclusive federal authority over the conduct of foreign relations is both constitutionally mandated and essential to the orderly conduct of our nation's international relations.97

The court's holding means that the federal government may only
preclude state interference with the conduct of foreign relations by
making self-executing treaties.98 Certainly such a holding greatly undermines the conduct of diplomacy and has substantial constitutional
implications.
D. Filariga v. Pena-rala: An Evolution in International Law
1. Filarigav. Pena-frala99
The Filartigacase may prove to be the most significant domestic
case dealing with international law in this century. Discussion of this
case will be limited here to the court's analysis of what constitutes in95. Id at 591 (quoting Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 443 (1968) (Stewart, J.

concurring)).
96. See sections HlI-IV of this Note, infra.
97. See 501 F. Supp. at 595.
98. The court in .4lien Children Education stated:
[The federal government's exclusive authority over foreign relations] in the absence of the exercise of the power to make treaties having the effect of domestic
law, has not evolved to prohibit the states from enacting laws which may affect an
area of international concern.
501 F. Supp. at 595.
99. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
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ternational law, and to a discussion of how to conceptualize a cause of
action under the Alien Tort Statute.10 °
Filartigais an unusual lawsuit. It is a private tort action brought
by aliens against foreign government officials for acts of torture perpetrated in the foreign country. The plaintiffs were Dr. Joel and Dolly
Filartiga, the father and sister of a seventeen-year-old boy allegedly
tortured to death by defendant Pena-Irala in Paraguay in 1976. Both
plaintiffs and defendants were citizens of the Republic of Paraguay,
although Ms. Filartiga had applied for permanent political asylum in
the United States. Defendant Pena-Irala, Inspector General of Police
in Asunci6n, Paraguay at the time of the murder, allegedly killed the
young Filartiga in retaliation for his father's political opposition to the
government. Dr. Filartiga subsequently brought an unsuccessful criminal action against Pena-Irala in the Paraguayan courts.' 0 '
In 1979, it was learned that Pena-Irala had entered the United
States. Dolly Filartiga, by then living in the United States, filed suit
with her father in the Eastern District of New York. The wrongful
death cause of action was stated as arising under:
wrongful death statutes; the U.N. Charter; the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights; the U.N. Declaration against Torture; the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man; and other pertinent declarations, documents and practices constituting the
customary international law of human rights and the law of nations
as well as 28 U.S.C. § 1350, Article II, sec. 2 and the Supremacy
Clause of the United States Constitution.' 0 2
Jurisdiction was claimed under the general federal question provision
(28 U.S.C. § 1331), ° 3 and under the Alien Tort Statute (28 U.S.C.
§ 1350).10 4
The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction.
In doing so, the court relied on dicta in two recent Second Circuit opin100. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1976).

101. 630 F.2d at 878. The primary result of the criminal case was that Dr. Filartiga's
attorney was arrested, shackled to a wall in police headquarters, and threatened with death
by Pena-Irala. Dr. Filartiga claimed that his attorney was subsequently disbarred without
cause and that after four years the criminal trial had not progressed. Id
102. Id at 879.
103. Because the court found jurisdiction under § 1350 (see discussion at notes 111-29
infra), it did not address the question of jurisdiction under § 1331, though it stated that it
"might also sustain jurisdiction" under that provision. Id at 887 n.22. See also discussion
of this issue in conjunction with the Hanoch Tel-Oren case at notes 164-86 infra.
104. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 states: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any
civil action by an alien for tort only committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty
of the United States."
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ions that narrowly construed "the law of nations" as used in section
1350, to exclude that law which governs a state's treatment of its own
citizens."' t Thus, when the case came before the Second Circuit, only
the jurisdictional question was presented.
In deciding the jurisdictionaf question, the central issue before the
Second Circuit was whether the alleged conduct violated the "law of
nations."1 " 6 The court first evaluated the acceptable sources of international law. At the same time it discussed what level of international
assent is required for these sources to be considered international law.'
Finally, the court evaluated various sources to determine if the prohibition against torture met those requirements.
In considering the acceptable sources of international law, the
Fl/artiga court looked to the three classic sources enumerated by the
Supreme Court in United States v. Smith :107 the work of jurists, the
general usage and practice of nations, and judicial decisions recognizing and enforcing international law. 10 8 The court pointed out that the
holding in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino10 9 requires a -high
standard of mutual assent between civilized nations before a rule may
be said to be part of the law of nations. 10
Because section 1350 requires a violation of the law of nations, a
more searching preliminary review of the merits is necessary than
would be the case under the more flexible "arising under" formulation
of section 1331. Noting with approval the standard used by Judge
Friendly in II v. Vencap, Ltd,II the court stated:
It is only where the nations of the world have demonstrated that the
wrong is of mutual, and not merely several, concern, by means of
express internationalaccords, that a wrong generally recognized becomes an international law violation within the meaning of the
statute. 112
It is important to recognize the demanding standards the Second Circuit applied here. By requiring "express international accords" as a
necessary source of the norm asserted, the court went well beyond Sab105. 630 F.2d at 880 (citing Dreyfus v. Von Finck, 534 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1976) and IIT v.
Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975)).
106. The court equates the terms "international law" and "the law of nations" in the first
sentence of the opinion. 630 F.2d at 877.
107. 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153 (1820).
108. Id at 160-61.
109. 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
110. 630 F.2d at 881.,
111. 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975).
112. 630 F.2d at 888 (emphasis added).
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batino, which specified a stringent standard of mutual assent but not
express agreements.
The court maintained throughout the opinion that the international law against torture is extremely clear and well accepted, noting
that "there are few, if any, issues in international law today on which
opinion seems to be so united as the limitations on a state's power to
torture persons held in its custody." 1 3 Nonetheless, the court made a
searching analysis of numerous specific sources of the norm.
In evaluating articles 55 and 56 of the U.N. Charter, the court
stated that the Charter "makes it clear that in this modem age a state's
114
treatment of its own citizens is a matter of international concern."
However, the court noted that it previously held the Charter's mandate
16
' 1 5 United States v. Toscanino,1
not to be "wholly- self-executing."
however, established the Charter as evidence of binding principles of
international law for United States courts. 1 17 Thus, the court concluded that although there is no universal agreement as to the precise
extent of the "human rights and fundamental freedoms" guaranteed by
the Charter, there is unanimous agreement that "the guaranties include, at a bare minimum, the right to be free from torture."'1 8
The court began its analysis of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights by stating that the prohibition against torture "has become part of customary international law, as evidenced and defined by
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights."' " 9 The court noted that
the UDHR was adopted without dissent by the U.N. General Assembly, and that eighteen nations have incorporated it into their own constitutions. 2 0 It also observed that the U.N. General Assembly declared
the Charter precepts as embodied in the UDHR to "constitute basic
principles of international law."1'' The court gave implicit endorsement to the view that the UDHR "has become, intoto, a part of binding, customary international law."' 2 2
113. Id at 881 (citing Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964)).
114. 630 F.2d at 881.
115. Id (citing Hitai v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 343 F.2d 466 (2d Cir.
1965)).
116. 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974), discussed at notes 236-37, Zvfza.
117. 630 F.2d at 882 n.9.
118. Id at 882.
119. Id
120. Id at 883 n.10.
121. Id at 882 (citing G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV) (Oct. 24, 1970)).
122. Id at 883 (citing Nayor, Human Rights: The UnitedNations and United Slates Foreign Policy, 19 -ARv.iNt'L L. 813, 816-17 (1978) and Waldlock, Human Rj'ghts in ContemporaryInternationalLaw and the Signftance of the European Convention, INT'L & COMP.
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The court also considered General Assembly Resolutions such as
the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected
to Torture.12 The court noted the added significance of General Asprecision the oblisembly Resolutions "because they specify with great
124
gations of member nations under the Charter."
Turning to another of the Smith criteria, the court considered the
modem usage and practice of nations. By looking to such international
125
treaties and accords as the American Convention on Human Rights,
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,1 26 and the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,1 27 the court found universal renunciation of torture.12 This finding was also supported in the constitutions1 29of over
fifty-five nations, and various U.S. State Department studies.
In the course of its lengthy analysis of the present state of the international human rights law regarding torture, the court recognized two
extremely significant evolutionary developments in the nature of international law. First, international human rights law, particularly regarding torture, is no longer merely a part of "natural law," but has
finally taken its rightful place among the positive law of human society.
This new status for the international law against torture is a necessary
concomitant of the standard and source requirements that the court set
for section 1350 jurisdiction. The law had to be found in "express international accords," that is in positive law, or jurisdiction could not have
been obtained.
The second change in international law recognized in the Fl/artiga
decision is that international law now governs individuals as well as
states, and that states are therefore prohibited from violating the international legal rights of their own citizens. This development is reflected in the Second Circuit's overruling of its earlier dicta in Dreyfus
v. Von Finck and IIT v. Vencap, Ltd 3 As the Fllartigacourt stated,
"[to hold that] violations of international law do not occur when the
L.Q., Supp. lubl. No. 11, at 15 (1965)). With the addition of the word "binding," this final
comment is virtually identical to the unattributed statement with which the court began its
discussion of the UDHR.
123. G.A. Res. 3452, 30 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 34) 91, U.N. Doc. A/1034 (1975).
124. 630 F.2d at 883.
125. Supra note 1.
126. Id
127. Id
128. 630 F.2d at 883-84.
129. Id at 884.
130. See text accompanying note 105 supra.
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aggrieved parties are nationals of the acting state, is clearly out of tune
with the current usage and practice of international law."'' It is no
longer solely up to the discretion of individual states to define what is a
matter of domestic jurisdiction, because "the nations have made it their
business, both through international accords and unilateral action, to
be concerned with domestic human rights violations of this
magnitude."' 32
International law has gone through considerable change since the
founding of this country. Our common law heritage required domestic
courts to apply international law when appropriate, and it was readily
used by United States courts during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries to protect individuals victimized by violations of recognized international law.' 33
By the middle of the nineteenth century, a more restrictive theory
of international law came into vogue. 134 This view was based on a concept of a global community populated by isolated nation-states who
maintained exclusive discretion over matters within their boundaries. 135 Under this view, non-state actors were excluded from the international legal framework, and individuals were considered to have no
international legal capacity. 136 Individuals were forced to rely on domestic law to remedy violations of international law. When the state
as was often the case with torture, this view
was doing the violating,
37
became unrealistic.
The barbarism of the Second World War struck the conscience of
the world. Numerous international instruments protecting human
rights came into existence, endorsed by many states. 38 Thus, the
evolution discerned by the Fiartiacourt represents a return to the
concept of international law that was prominent early in this country's
history.

13

131. 630 F.2d at 884.
132. Id at 889.
-133. Note, Federal Jurisdiction and the Protection of International Human Rights, 9
N.Y.U. Rav. L. & Soc. CHANGE 199, 215 (1980). One of the most common applications of
international law for and against individuals was under the doctrine of host&s humanis
generis, under which numerous domestic courts found pirates and slave traders liable for
violations of international law. See, e.g. U.S. v. Pirates, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 184 (1820).
134. Blum & Steinhardt, supra note 3, at 64.
135. Id at 65.
136. Note, supra note 133, at 199.
137. Id
138. See, e.g., note I sura.
139. See Blum & Steinhardt, supra note 3, at 56, 60-62; Note, supra note 133, at 21'3.
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2. In the Wake of Filartiga: Fernandez v. Wilkinson
A more recent case involving domestic application of international
human rights law is Fernandezv. Wilkinson.140 This case also provides
a useful overview of the sources and standards employed in discerning
international law and the authority that such international law carries
in United States courts.
As in Filartiga,the plaintiff in Fernandezhad an unusual relationship to the forum, in that he was one of approximately 130,000 Cuban
nationals who immigrated to the United States in June of 1980. However, because Mr. Fernandez admitted conviction of a crime involving
"moral turpitude" while in Cuba, 14 1 he was held to be an excludable
alien within the meaning of United States immigration law. 42 As a
result, he was ordered deported. The Immigration and Naturalization
Service and the Department of State were unable to return him to
Cuba because Cuba did not wish to take him back. As a result, Mr.
Fernandez was confined for an indefinite period in a maximum security prison, without bail, and without having been charged with or convicted of a crime in this country.
Mr. Fernandez claimed that his treatment violated the eighth
amendment's protections against cruel and unusual punishment, and
the fifth amendment's due process clause. After lengthy analysis, the
district court concluded that the indeterminate maximum security deunforseeable deportation constituted arbitrary
tention pending
143
detention.
However, because Mr. Fernandez was an excludable alien, he was
subject to a time-honored legal fiction that does not recognize him as
having entered United States borders. Consequently, he was not protected by any of the rights normally guaranteed by the United States
Constitution.'" This precedent was so well established that the court
felt compelled to follow it.145 Since domestic law was unavailable to
140. 505 F. Supp. 787 (D. Kan. 1980), af'dsub non Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson,
654 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981).
141. Mr. Fernandez's crimes were two thefts of suitcases, and attempted burglary. He
claimed that his crimes in part had been dictated by the economic exigencies in Cuba, and
that he had been convicted in military tribunals. He requested political asylum in the
United States, but it was denied. 505 F. Supp. at 789.
142. 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(9), (20) (1976).
143. 505 F. Supp. at 791.
144. Id at 790 (citing Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972), Mathews v. Diaz, 426
U.S. 67 (1976), and Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977)).
145. The court rejected plaintiff's argument that the potency of the fiction diminishes
over time. Such an argument finds support in dictum in Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S.
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Mr. Fernandez, the court turned to international law.
14 7
146
The Fernandezcourt cited The Nereide, The PaqueteHabana,

and Filartigafor the proposition that international law is a part of the
law of the United States which federal courts are bound to ascertain
and administer in an appropriate case.' 14

Again citing Filartiga, the

court stated that "principles of customary international law may be discerned from an overview of express international conventions, the
teachings of legal scholars, the general custom and practice of nations,
and relevant judicial opinions."' 149 The court then stated that international law so derived generally becomes binding on states in one of two
ways: either by express consent, as in ratifying a treaty, or by established custom evidenced through wide practice.

50

The court next considered various sources of international law and
began by looking at numerous international agreements dealing with
human rights. As was true in Filartiga,these documents were consid-

ered, not for their independent legal significance, but as evidence of
established international custom and practice. The court considered
the U.N. Charter, the UDHR, the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, the American Convention on Human Rights, the European Convention for the Protection. of Human Rights and Funda-

mental Freedoms, and the decisions of international tribunals, 5 ' as
well as the views expressed by other branches of the federal government.152 This Note will focus on the court's treatment of the U.N.
Charter and the UDHR.
The court described the U.N. Charter as "one important document
by which the U.S. is bound."' 5 3 However, the court offered no discus-

sion of how or to what extent the Charter is binding, nor any elabora763, 770 (1950), in which the court stated that an alien is "accorded a generous and ascending scale of rights as he increases his identity with our society." The district court in Fernandez was unwilling to "initiate the corrosion of this venerable legal doctrine" by adopting
such dictum. 505 F. Supp. at 790.
146. 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388, 422 (1815).
147. 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
148. 505 F. Supp. at 798.
149. Id
150. Id at 795.
151. Id at 796-97. See also note 1 supra.
152. Id at 797-98. It should be noted that several United States statutes, approved by
both the legislative and executive branches, limit aid to governments exhibiting a consistent
pattern of violations of internationally recognized human rights. See Weissbrodt, United
States Ratjfcation of the Human Rights Covenants, 63 MINN. L. REv. 35, 45 n.72 (1978);
Kaufman,.4 Legal Remedyfor InternationalTorture? N.Y. Times, Nov. 9, 1980, § 6 (Magazine), at 49. See also discussion of Crockett v. Reagan, jupra note 14.
153. 505 F. Supp. at 796.
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tion of what this binding quality of the Charter means in terms of
United States obligations generally or the rights of Mr. Fernandez specifically. Because neither Mr. Fernandez, nor the amici in the case asserted any direct violation of Charter obligations, the Charter was
discussed in the case as "the symbol of human rights on an interna'
tional scale." 154
The UDHR was introduced as the most important of a great
number of international declarations, resolutions, and recommendations that are "not technically binding."' 5 The court quoted Eleanor
Roosevelt for the proposition that the UDHR was not originally intended to be legally binding. 15 6 However, the court also quoted Richard Bilder, who stated: "although initially only declaratory and nonbinding, [the standards set by the UDHR] have by now, through wide
as having a normative effect, beacceptance and recitation by nations
157
come binding customary law."'

The court further quoted the separate opinion of Vice President
Ammoun of the International Court of Justice in the Advisory Opinion
on the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia for the proposition that the UDHR may be binding as declaratory of custom within
the meaning of-article 38(l)(b) of the Statute of the International Court
of Justice.

158

The court concluded that while the Declaration was not technically binding, it had come to carry considerably more weight than a
mere statement of basic principles: "it appears that the Declaration has
evolved into an important source of international human rights law." 159
Relying on the UDHR (and other sources as well) the court held that
arbitrary detention is prohibited by customary international law. 160
The Tenth Circuit affirmed this holding but declined to base its
opinion solely on international law. Instead, the court disposed of the
appeal by construing the applicable domestic statutes to require Fernandez' release. 161 In doing so, the court effectively overruled a long
line of cases that had denied excludable aliens the rights afforded by
Id (citing Stotzky, Book Review, 11 MIAMI J. INTL L. 229, 237 (1979)).
505 F. Supp. at 796.
Id
Id (quoting Bilder, The Status of InternationalHuman Rights Law.- An Overview,
1978 INT'L L. & PRAc. 1, 8).
158. 505 F. Supp. at 796.
159. Id at 796-97.
160. Id at 798.
161. 654 F.2d 1382, 1386-87 (10th Cir. 1981), sub nom, Rodriguez-Femandez v.
Wilkinson.
154.
155.
156.
157.
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the statutes. 162 To support its holding, the appellate court referred to
international law to help define due process, stating:
It seems proper ...

to consider international law principles for no-

tions of fairness as to [the] propriety of holding aliens in detention.
No principle of international law is more fundamental than the conbeings should be free from arbitrary
cept that human
163
imprisonment.

3. Conceptualizing a Cause of Action Under International
Human Rights Law: Hanoch Tel-Oren
A fundamental question went virtually undiscussed by the Filartiga court; specifically, how should a plaintiff properly conceptualize a
cause of action under section 1350? This question was confronted in
the recent case of Hanoch Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab epublic. 64 The
case arose out of the terrorist attack of a tourist bus in Israel in March,
1978, in which twenty-nine people were killed.1 65 The plaintiffs in Hanoch Tel-Oren included the personal representatives of the murdered,
as well as injured survivors. Defendants were the Libyan Arab Republic, the Palestine Liberation Organization, The Palestine Information
Office, the National Association of Arab Americans, and the Palestine
Congress of North America.
Plaintiffs brought suit in the Federal District Court for the District
of Columbia and jurisdiction was alleged under the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act of 1976 (28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332(a), 1441(d), 1602-11),
diversity of citizenship (28 U.S.C. § 1332), federal question (28 U.S.C.
§ 1331), and the Alien Tort Claims Statute (28 U.S.C. § 1350).166
granted defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of
Judge Green
67

jurisdiction.

Significantly, the opinion recognizes that because international
law is part of th&federal common law, an allegation of a violation of
the law of nations makes "federal" law sufficiently central to the dispute for the purposes of section 1331 ("federal question") jurisdiction.1 68 The opinion goes a step further, however, when in dictum it
162. See text accompanying notes 144-145 supra.
163. 654 F.2d at 1388. The court cited various other international documents, including
the UDHR and the American Convention on Human Rights. Id
164. 517 F. Supp. 542 (D.D.C. 1981) (Green, J.).
165. 517 F. Supp. at 544.
166. Id at 545.
167. Id at 551.
168. Id at 548.
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and section 1350 are
states that "the jurisdictional bases of section 1331
1 69
identical as to the role of the law of nations."
Judge Green concluded that plaintiffs failed to establish jurisdiction under either section 1331 or section 1350. The judge distinguished
between the jurisdictional issue and the issue of liability and interna-'
tional law:
The question whether the conduct complained of here violated the
law of nations, a question the court does not reach, is fundamentally
different, however, from the question whether treaties or even international law generally provide the plaintiffs with a cause of action. 170
In.failing to find any cause of action provided either by treaties or
customary international law, Judge Green placed heavy emphasis on
policy implications. The judge noted that allowing jurisdiction under
section 1331 for claims under the law of nations, absent a private right
of action, "sanctions judicial interference with foreign affairs and interto1
national relations, traditionally an area where courts have chosen 17
stay their hands absent some fundamental constitutional violation."
Similarly, the judge refused jurisdiction under section 1350,172 absent a
private right of action, stating that:
Otherwise, federal courts would clutch power over cases, under the
guise of the law of nations, undoubtedly casting effect on international relations and foreign policy when no country, friend or foe,
has consented to an American court opening its dooi to one alleging
violations of international legal principles. 73
The potential breadth of Judge Green's opinion in Hanoch TelOren is enormous. Conspicuously absent from the opinion is any discussion of the Fiartigacase, which is odd because the opinion cites
Filariga at the outset of its consideration of section 1350 jurisdiction. 174 The Filartigaopinion did not address the jurisdictional question specifically in terms of whether the law of nations allowed a
private right of action for torture, yet such a finding is implicit in Filar169. Id at 549 n.2.
170. Id at 546.
171. Id at 548.
172. It is significant that Judge Green considered the absence of a private cause of action
to be a failure of a jurisdictional prerequisite, not merely grounds for a demurrer under FED.
R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In doing so, Judge Green was affirming the holding of Judge Friendly in
UT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975). 517 F. Supp. at 550.
173. 517 F. Supp. at 550.
174. Id at 548. Fiartigaheld that jurisdiction under section 1350 existed under facts
similar to those in Hanoch Tel-Oren. See text accompanying notes 102-29 supra.
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175

The vague language of section 1350 makes definition of a cause of
action difficult. Jurisdiction over "torts in violation of the law of nations" could be interpreted in at least two different ways. First, this
phrasing could mean that international law is relevant only for providing jurisdiction, while the underlying cause of action for a tort is governed by the substantive tort law of the situs. 176 While this approach to

the domestic application of international law under section 1350 can be
justified constitutionally as an instance of "protective jurisdiction,"177 it
strains the limits of article III jurisdiction to have a case allegedly "arising under" the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States178 in
which the substantive law of the situs defines the cause of action.
The other approach to section 1350 jurisdiction interprets the statute as requiring that the alleged violation of the law of nations itself be
a tort. 179 Under this approach, courts apply international law as it has
been incorporated into federal common law. The constitutional question then becomes whether Congress has the power to treat controversies between aliens over torts in violation of international law as part of
federal law. As discussed above and at length in Filartiga,the law of
nations is part of federal law due to our common law heritage.' s0
While certain concerns for federalism may be raised in response to this
interpretation of section 1350, federal control over these matters seems
prudent,18 1and is consistent with the doctrine of hostishumanisgeneris,
long a tradition in our legal heritage.' 8 2
Judge Green's decision in Hanoch Tel Oren did not address these
issues. However, in concluding the opinion, Judge Green made the following, somewhat disturbing, statement:
When the framers crafted Article III and when the First Congress
175. The Filartigacourt's assertion that the claim was "grounded upon" the law of nations indicates that international law alone may create a federal right of action. Comment,
Tortureas a Tort in Violation ofInternationalLaw: Filartigav. Pena-Irala,33 STANFORD L.
REV. 353, 357 (1981).
176. See Blum & Steinhardt, supra note 3, at 97 (citing REsTATEMENT (FIRST AND SaCOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS). This approach was applied successfully in Abdul-Rahman
OmarAdra v. ClI1ft, 195 F. Supp. 857 (D. Md. 1961).
177. See generally Mishkin, The Federal 'Question'in the District Courts, 53 COLUM. L.
REv. 157, 184-96 (1953); Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 460 (1957) (Burton,
J. & Harlan, J. concurring).
178. Blum & Steinhardt, supra note 3, at 98..
179. Id at 98-102.
180. See text accompanying notes 133-39 supra.
181. See Blum & Steinhardt, supra note 3, at 100-01.
182. See note 133 supra.
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considered jurisdictional grants to the federal courts, they did not
contemplate the use of the federal courts as a substitute for an interinternational
national tribunal, adjudicating claims arising under
1 83
law, when no private right of action was provided.
After making this broad pronouncement, Judge Green proceeded to
describe in a footnote' 14 an extreme example of how human rights lawsuits might become problematic. by unduly intruding into the domestic
affairs of sovereign nations.
It is regrettable that this sort of extreme example should be cited
because it clearly misses the carefully circumscribed analysis applied in
Filarfiga. The Second Circuit in Filartigarecognized that section 1350
had bein rendered a dead letter by restrictive judicial interpretations
ever since its passage by Congress in 1789. However, the Filarigacourt
also noted that this was due in large part to "the fact that earlier cases
did not involve such well-established, universally recognized norms of
international law" as that against torture.' 8 5 The Second Circuit applied a very restrictive standard of what constitutes international law
and found that the prohibition against torture met that standard.
When an extreme example is cited in which either the alleged international norm does not meet this high standard or the facts do not support the application of the norm, the focus is removed from the legal
concepts at issue.
Does Judge Green mean to suggest that individuals may not bring
suit against pirates or against slave-traders for violation of international law? Does Judge Green reject the doctrine, firmly imbedded in
our legal heritage, of hostis humanis generis? Would Judge Green hold
that well-established, universally recognized norms prohibiting torture
and genocide have not evolved such that these two torts now fall within
the doctrine? Considering the detailed legal analysis provided by the
Second Circuit in Filartiga,as well as in the articles cited in the Hanoch
Tel-Oren opinion, these important issues deserve more serious consideration. Presumably, as the Fiartiga court noted, these issues "will be
183. 517 F. Supp. at 551.
184. Id at n.5. In this footnote the court observed that:
[tihe possible presumptuousness of private human rights lawsuits is self-evident.
Imagine a suit brought in Mexico, for example, by the Black Panther Party'against
the visiting chief of police of Philadelphia, alleging violations of international conventions prohibiting genocide and systematic racial discrimination. Certainly,
such an application of international law would meet stiff, and legitimate, opposition in the United States.
185. 630 F.2d 876, 888 (2d Cir. 1980).
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in subsequent

Summary: Are Domestic Courts Fertile Fora for the Application
of International Human Rights Law?

Domestic courts may be fertile fora for the application of international human rights law, as demonstrated by the cases discussed above.
Creative legal theories and extensive evidentiary substantiation have
combined to produce some promising holdings in the last two years.
Nonetheless, in the march to develop international human rights law,
these cases do not step out too forcefully; they leave much undone.
Numerous fundamental tensions surrounding the incorporation of international law into the domestic legal framework remain unresolved.
The obligations of the United States under the human rights provisions
of the U.N. Charter remain weak and unclear. While there are promising signs regarding the UDHR, its status is uncertain as well. Although
domestic courts make proud pronouncements regarding these instruments and our international obligations, they fail to explicitly endorse
them as law.
Clearly, the time is ripe to do just that. It is essential that human
rights advocates take advantage of these encouraging signals and work
to further the evolution of human rights law. The cases discussed
above illustrate some potential areas for accomplishing this goal. The
following two sections of this Note focus on one of the central issues in
this area: the role played by human rights treaties in the domestic legal
structure, within the framework of self-executing treaty analysis.
III.

SELF-EXECUTING TREATY ANALYSIS: ITS
ORIGINS AND APPLICATION TO
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
DOCUMENTS

The doctrine known as self-executing treaty analysis is one of the
most amorphous in all of American jurisprudence. In 1961, a Florida
district court noted: "[I]t is difficult to extract any clear principle for
judicial guidance from the cases discussing this subject."' 8 7 As recently
as 1979, the Fifth Circuit said in U.S. v. Postal, "the self-executing
186. Id at 885.
187. Aerovias Interamericanas de Panama, S.A. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 197 F.
Supp. 230, 245 (S.D. Fla. 1961).
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question is perhaps one of the most confounding in treaty law." '
Unfortunately, this vague concept deals with one of the most fundamental constitutional relationships in our legal structure: the role of
treaties in the domestic legal framework. The manner with which the
United States handles its treaty obligations plays a significant role in
the development of international law; therefore, the role of treaties in
our legal framework deserves careful consideration.
Under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution,
treaties made under the authority of the United States are the supreme
law of the land." 9 This constitutional grant of authority to treaties is
neither vague nor limited. It was the direct result of a Constitutional
Convention specifically convened to give the federal government clear
and broad powers in foreign relations. 9 ' However, judicial practice
has circumscribed this broad constitutional grant through self-executing treaty analysis.
A. Self-Executing Analysis in Foster and Percheman: Illegitimate
Parents?
The seminal case in this area is Foster v. Neilson.19 1 At issue was
whether land located west of the Perdido River was included in the
Florida Purchase. The treaty provision, as well as the surrounding history and context of the treaty, supported conflicting interpretations.
Congressional attempts to interpret the treaty reached inconsistent
results.
Chief Justice Marshall, who wrote the opinion, found himself in
the minority regarding the meaning of the provision at issue. As a
compromise, he was able to encourage a majority of the Court to agree
with him that the question was political and that the Court should defer to the lead of Congress.192 In an opinion which may have reflected
his predisposition against self-executing treaties, 93 Marshall wrote:
A treaty is in its nature a contract between two nations, not a legislative act. It does not generally effect, of itself, the object to be accomplished, especially so far as its operation is infraterritorial; but is
188.
189.
190.
L. 178,
191.
192.
193.

589 F.2d 862, 876 (5th Cir. 1979).
U.S. CONsT. art. VI, para. 2.
Evans, Sef-Executing Treaties in the UnitedStates ofAmerica, 30 BRrr. Y.B. INT'L
179-81 (1953).
27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829).
Wright, su.pra note 21, at 67.
Id at 65 n.12.
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carried into execution by the sovereign power of the respective parties to the instrument.
In the United States a different principle is established. Our
Constitution declares a treaty to be the law of the land. It is, consequently, to be regarded in courts of justice as equivalent to an Act of
the Legislature, whenever it operates of itself without the aid of any
legislative provision. But when the terms of the stipulation import a
contract, when either of the parties engages to perform a particular
act the treaty addresses itself to the political, not the judicial department; and the Legislature must execute the contract before it can become a rule for the court.194
Foremost in this reasoning is an awareness of the separation of
powers problem with its attendant "political question" attributes. 195
Congress already had attempted to interpret the treaty and the Court
was reluctant to add to the confusion. Because of the overriding separation of powers aspects in Foster, it has been argued that the opinion
is of no value for interpreting the relation of a treaty provision concerning individual rights to state legislation. 196
The questionable basis of the Foster holding becomes more apparent in the other seminal case for self-executing analysis, UnitedStates v.
Percheman. 9 7 In this case, decided four years after Foster, Marshall
interpreted the same clause of the same treaty and found it to be selfexecuting.
There are several notable distinctions between the Foster and
Percheman cases. Unlike Foster, the lands involved in Percheman
were clearly within the ceded territory. The Spanish text of the treaty,
not consulted in Foster, indicated a slightly different meaning for one
phrase in the treaty. 19s It has been argued that the two opinions are
compatible because the greater clarity of the treaty provision obviated a
separation of powers problem in the later case. 199 However, the meaning gained through the Spanish translation lent no further insights as to
which branch of the government was responsible for giving effect to the
treaty."o Additionally, the congressional committees were still in oper194. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 314.
195. Note, Self-Executing Treaties and Human Rights Provisions of the United Nations
Charter-.4 Separationof PowersProblem, 25 BUFFALO L. REv. 773, 775 (1976).
196. Wright, supra note 21, at 68.
197. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51 (1833).
198. Id at 88. The phrase in Foster read, "[the land grants] shall be ratified and confirmed"; in Percheman, the Spanish text read "shall remain ratified and confirmed."
199. Note, supra note 195, at 776.
200. Wright, supra note 21, at 66 n.13.
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ation when Percheman was decided, and Marshall devoted a considerable portion of the opinion to attempting to clarify their function in light
of the treaty."° In sum, these two progenitors of self-executing analysis
do not shed much light upon the issue.
In spite of the apparent problems with this analysis, the judiciary
has attempted to apply it for the last 150 years. One opinion often cited
for a clear presentation of the analysis is the HeadMoney Cases.20 2 In
this opinion, Justice Miller stated:
A treaty is primarily a compact between independent nations. It depends for the enforcement of its provisions on the interest and the
honor of the governments which are parties to it. If these fail, its
infraction becomes the subject of international negotiations and reclamations,.., which may in the end be enforced by actual war. It is
obvious that with all this the judicial courts have nothing to do and
can give no redress. But a treaty may also contain provisions which
confer certain rights upon the citizens or subjects of one of the nations residing in the territorial limits of the other, which partake of
the nature of municipal law, and which are capable of enforcement
as between private parties in the courts of the ountry....

The

Constitution of the United States places such provisions as these in
the same category as other laws of Congress. .

.

. A treaty, then, is a

law of the land as an act of Congress is, whenever its provisions prescribe a rule by which the rights of the private citizen or subject may
be determined. And when such rights are of a nature to be enforced
in a court of justice, that court resorts to the treaty for a rule of decision for the case before it as it would to a statute.20 3
Two points should be drawn from this passage: 1) had Marshall applied this interpretation in Foster, the treaty provision at issue there
would have been self-executing, 2° and 2) while the judiciary has no
role in treaty and war negotiations between nations, it has a constitutional mandate to enforce all treaty provisions whenever they prescribe
a rule by which the rights of individuals may be determined. The result of such conflicting precedents as Foster, Percheman, and Head
Money is that the entire line of self-executing analysis is in a state of
confusion.
201. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) at 89-98.
202. 112 U.S. 580 (1884).
203. Id at 598.

204. Wright, supra note 21, at 65 n.12.
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Self-Executing Analysis and International Human Rights
Treaties

Several early cases cited the human rights provisions of the U.N.
Charter as supporting authority for their holdings. 20 5 These cases were
decided at a time when the events that led to the creation of the United
Nations, and the renewed sense of world cooperation that the U.N. embodied, were fresh in mind. The first case in which the self-executing
nature of the U.N. Charter was central to the holding of the opinion
was Sei0Fujii
v. California decided by one of the California courts of
2 6
appeal.
1. Sei Fujii v. Calfornia
Sei Fujii concerned a challenge to the California Alien Land Law,
which clearly discriminated on the basis of race. z0 7 In finding the state
statute invalid, the court relied on the human rights provisions of the
United Nations Charter. The court noted that in accordance with article VI of the United States Constitution, the Charter is the supreme law
of the land, and any state law to the contrary is invalid. The court
Charter's "plain
found that the Alien Land Law was in conflict with the
2 z0
intent.
and
purpose
"unmistakeable
and
language"
The court of appeal also discussed the UDHR, concluding that the
Alien Land Law was contrary to the letter and spirit of the U.N. Charter and to article 17 of the UDHR, and that state law must yield to the
treaty's superior authority.20 9
This holding caused a national furor.2 1 0 One of the most radical
205. Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948) (concurring opinions of Justices Black &
Douglas, and Justices Murphy & Rutledge); Namba v. McCourt, 185 Or. 579, 204 P.2d 569
(1949).
206. 217 P.2d 481 (1950), rev'd 38 Cal. 2d 718, 242 P.2d 617 (1952).
207. See note 27 supra.
208. 217 P.2d at 486.
209. Id at 488.
210. One reaction was an urgent telegram to the counsel for the State of California from
Judge Hudson, an outspoken opponent of granting self-executing status to human rights
provisions. The telegram read, in part:
Articles 55 and 56 and the other provisions of the Charter cited by the court
are in no sense self-executing, and they are not operative as a part of our local law.
Apart from legislation enacted by Congress the provisions of the Charter on
Human Rights cannot properly be said to have any effect on the Alien Land Law
of California. Even less defensible is the court's reliance on Article 17 of the Declaration of Human Rights promulgated by the General Assembly of the United
Nations in 1948. That declaration does not have the force of a treaty, and its preamble shows clearly that the declaration was not intended to have any binding
effect on the members of the organization. Even if Article 17 of the declaration
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reactions was a constitutional amendment proposed by Senator Bricker
requiring that treaties could "become effective as internal law in the
United States only through legislation valid in the absence of international agreements."2"' This attempt at substantial alteration of the
treaty making power as established in the Constitution was nearly successful in the Senate.212
21 3
The California Supreme Court reversed the court of appeal.
The Court found the Alien Land Law invalid, but based its holding
independently upon the fourteenth amendment. Citing Foster as authority for its self-executing analysis, the Court looked to the intent of
the signatory
parties as manifested by the language of the
214
instrument.
The Court found that it was "clear" from looking solely to the
language of the U.N. Charter that none of its human rights provisions
were self-executing. 215 This "clear" finding stands in contrast to the
"unmistakable purpose and intent" observed by the appellate court.21 6
One of the reasons that the Court found the language of article 56"inadequate for self-execution was that the Court interpreted this article as
contemplating "future legislative action by the several nations . . . to
accomplish the declared objectives. ' 21 7 Nowhere does the Court con-

sider the UDHR, nor does it address the question of whether the
UDHR constitutes this future legislation, thereby giving fuller, more
specific meaning to the terms of the Charter.
One significant factor that may explain the ultimate result in Fujii,
is that it was decided before Brown v. Boardof Education.218 Thus, the
provision in article 55(c) of the Charter requiring "equal rights.

. .

for

all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion," would
have been in direct conflict with a number of state laws that had not yet
were operative in American law, its terms are too general for the conclusion to be
drawn thavthe Alien Land Law of California is in conflict with it.
Refprinted in R. LILLICH & F. NEWMAN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: PROBLEMS OF
LAW AND POLICY 97 (1979).
211. TreatiesandExecutiveAgreements: Hearingson SJ.Res. 1 Before the Senate Judiciary Comnm, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 13-14 (1955). For a discussion of the Bricker Amendment
and its effect on subsequent U.S. policy towards ratifying human rights treaties, see Weissbrodt, supra note 152, at 38 n.45.
212. 100 CONG. REc. 2255, 2262 (1954).
213. 38 Cal. 2d 718, 242 P.2d 617 (1952).
214. Id at 721, 242 P.2d at 620.
215. Id at 722, 242 P.2d at 620.
216. See text accompanying note 208 supra.
217. 38 Cal. 2d at 722, 242 P.2d at 621.

218. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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been struck down under the fourteenth amendment.2 1 9 It has been sug-

gested that if the Fujii case were to be decided today, the result would
be different. 22 Because the California Supreme Court opinion was not
appealed to the United States Supreme Court, the question technically
remains open for the country as a whole.221
2. Post-Fujii Applications
Most of the subsequent cases that have considered whether the
human rights provisions of the Charter are self-executing have merely
cited Fujii, or have echoed the decision without providing any additional analysis.2 22 Typical of this line of shallow evaluation is the recent case of Davis v. Immigration andNaturalizationService.3
In Davis, the plaintiff, who had earlier renounced his United
States citizenship, attempted to enter the United States on a "World
Service Authority" passport, not considered a valid entry document by
the Immigration and Naturalization Service. He was taken into custody, deemed an excludable alien and was facing deportation when he
brought a habeas corpus action. He made certain arguments based on
domestic immigration laws, as well as alleging a violation of article
13(2) of the UDHR, which provides that "[e]veryone has the right to
leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country." 4
The court's response to this argument is found in a footnote where
it states: "It is well established that the United Nations Charter does
not supersede United States law.. . . The petitioner's argument based
on Article 13(2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights fails for
the same reason."" 5 In light of the status that the Filartigaand Fernandez courts granted the UDHR, such an offhand dismissal of the argument seems less than thorough. Unfortunately, however, such shallow
219. Note, supra note 195, at 782.
220. See Schliter, The Domestic Status of the Human Rights Clauses of the United Nations Charter, 61 CAL. L. REv. 110, 148 (1973); Note, IndividualEnforcement of Obligations
Arising Under the United Nations Charter,supra note 16, at 201.
221. Finch, The Need to Restrain the Treaty-Making Power of the United States Within
ConstitutionalLimits, 48 AM. J. INT'L L. 57, 72 (1954).
222. See, e.g., Vlissidis v. Anadell, 262 F.2d 398, 400 (7th Cir. 1959); Camacho v. Rodgers, 199 F. Supp. 155, 158 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); Hitai v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv.,
343 F.2d 466, 468 (2d Cir. 1965); Rice v. Sioux City Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc., 245
Iowa 147, 157-58, 60 N.W.2d 110, 116-17 (1953); Commonwealth v. Muskie, 507 F. Supp.
1035 (D.P.R. 1981).
223. 481 F. Supp. 1178 (D.D.C. 1979).
224. UDHR, supra note 1, art. 13(2).
225. 481 F. Supp. at 1183 n.7.
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analysis is not uncommon.2 26
3.

The Pauling Line

There is a line of cases which indicates that human rights provisions of the Charter should not be self-executing, and which uses the
same questionable self-executing analysis. Foremost among these is
the case of Paulingv. McElroy.2 2 7 In this case, plaintiffs sued to enjoin
United States nuclear testing on their island homes, alleging, inter alia,
a violation of international law and the United Nations Charter. The
court denied relief on all counts, stating in reference to the international law and Charter arguments:
The provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, the Trusteeship
Agreement for the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, and the international law principle of freedom of the seas relied on by plaintiffs
are not self-executing and do not vest any of the plaintiffs with individual legal rights which they may assert in this Court. The claimed
violations of such international obligations and principles may be asserted only by diplomatic negotiations between the sovereignties
concerned. 2 s
Even though the Pauling court failed to provide any other analysis or
authority to support this holding, it has been followed perfunctorily in
numerous subsequent cases. 2 9
It is not clear where the Pauling court, and those cases that have
followed it, draw authority for such self-executing analysis. It appears
to be based on the general notion that most treaties do not vest the
individual with sufficient legal character to enable him to invoke international law in domestic courts, and that such executory international
law can only be invoked by sovereign nations. Such a holding goes
against the provisions of article VI of the United States Constitution
which imposes an obligation on the judiciary to apply treaties as the
law of the land, and to vest individuals with international character
226. For example, a judge characterized a reference to international law as "junk and
gobbledygook" in Turner v. Ward (unpublished, N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1977), citedin R. LILLICH &
F. NEwMAN, supra note 210, at 121.
227. 164 F. Supp. 390 (D.D.C. 1958).
228. Id at 393.
229. See, ag., Orlando v. Laird, 317 F. Supp. -1013 (E.D.N.Y. 1970), aJ'd,443 F.2d 1039
(2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 869 (1971); United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267
(2d Cir. 1974) (Anderson, J. concurring in result); United States ex rel Lujon v. Gengler,
510 F.2d 62 (2d Cir. 1975), cert.denied481 U.S. 1001 (1975); Dreyfus v. Von Finck, 534 F.2d
24 (2d Cir. 1976); Commonwealth v. Muskie, 507 F. Supp. 1085 (D.P.R. 1981).
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whenever the treaty permits.2 3 °
Nonetheless, the American judiciary has shown a proclivity for a
Pauling analysis. This view of international law and the role of treaties
not only does disservice to the United States Constitution, but is clearly
out of touch with contemporary legal theory as well. Modem international law, especially international human rights treaties, firmly vest
individuals with international legal character.23 1 To the extent that the
Pauling version of self-executing analysis fails to comprehend this fundamental shift in the focus of international law, it is sorely in need of
re-evaluation and revision, and its application is ill-advised.
In the battle to establish the human rights provisions of the U.N.
Charter as self-executing, there have been victories of sorts. Some of
the earliest cases contained strong incantations of this nation's duty to
fulfill its pledges under the Charter. 232 Unfortunately, these references
tended to be vague, leaving the exact legal status of the Charter unthat should be
clear, but generally held it to be an important factor 233
policy.
public
States
United
assessing
considered when
A number of cases have found other articles of the Charter selfexecuting. Curran v. City of New york 2 3 4 held that article 104 was selfexecuting, but specifically reserved the question of the status of article
105 (concerning privileges and immunities of the United Nations).
Similarly, the case of Keeney v. United States2 5 apparently held that
articles 100 and 105 established a testimonial privilege for United Nations employees, although the holding was based on other evidentiary6
grounds. Finally, the Second Circuit in United States v. Toscanino23
based its holding on the obligatory force of article 2, paragraph 4 of the
Charter, yet stopped short of terming it self-executing. 237
A case with great potential for holding the human rights provi230. See text accompanying notes 194 and 203 supra.
231. See note 3 supra, and Singh, Domestic Jurisdiction and the Law of the United Nations 180-95 (1954) (doctoral dissertation reproduced on microfilm by University Microfilms, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1977).
232. See, e.g., concurrences of Justices Black and Douglas, and Justices Murphy and
Rutledge in Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948); Namba v. McCourt, 185 Or. 579,204
P.2d 569 (1949); Hurd v. Hodge, 162 F.2d 233 (D.C. Cir. 1947) (Edgerton, J. dissenting),
rev'd 334 U.S. 24 (1948).
233. See, e.g., Perez v. Sharp, 32 Cal. 2d 711, 198 P.2d 17 (1948) (Carter, J. concurring).
234. 191 Misc. 229, 77 N.Y.S.2d 206 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
235. 218 F.2d 843 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
236. 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974).
237. Id at 277-78. However, this holding was seriously limited, if not overruled, in the
subsequent case of United States ex rel Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62 (2d Cir. 1975), which
effectively adopted Judge Anderson's concurrence in Toscanino.
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sions of the Charter to be self-executing is the Ninth Circuit's opinion
inPeople of Sa#pan v. UnitedStates Dep't ofInterior. s In this case, the
citizens of Saipan challenged an abuse of power by the High Commissioner of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, who approved and
executed a commercial lease of property that the citizenry wanted re-.
served for public park purposes. Plaintiffs alleged that the High Commissioner violated both the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA), and the Trusteeship Agreement made pursuant to article 79 of
the United Nations Charter.
The Sa#pan court held that Trust Territory government was immune from review under the Administrative Procedure Act, and by
analogy, under NEPA as well." 9 However, using a somewhat innovative form of self-executing analysis, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court and held that "the Trusteeship Agreement can be a source of
rights enforceable by an individual litigant in a domestic court of
law.,240

The court did not find that any of the Charter articles discussed
were, standing alone, self-executing; in fact, even though plaintiffs
urged such a holding, the Sa#pan court assumed that they were not.241
The court held that the general principles outlined in the Charter had
been covered in more detail in the specific trusteeship agreement and
that the "preponderance of features" of the trusteeship agreement indicated its self-executing nature.242 Thus, while Sa#pan did not hold any
Charter provisions directly self-executing, it held that an agreement
made pursuant to Charter direction, and intended to detail and implement such direction, was self-executing. In many respects, these explicative functions that the Trusteeship Agreement served in relation to
the Charter are identical to those served by the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights.
The UDHR has had a mixed reception in the courts. As with the
Charter, the early cases were both promising and vague. In the 1948
case of Lincoln FederalLaborUnion v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co.,
Justice Frankfurter cited, in a footnote to his concurring opinion, article 20(2) of the UDHR as supporting authority for the holding.243 The
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.

502 F.2d 90 (9th Cir. 1974) cert. denied 420 U.S. 1003 (1974).
502 F.2d at 94-96.
502 F.2d at 97.
Id
Id
335 U.S. 525, 549 n.5 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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1950 case of Wilson v. Hacker2" cited article 2 of the UDHR, which
prohibits discrimination based on sex, as "[i]ndicative of the spirit of
our times." The Filarigaand Fernandez cases represent the farthest
steps forward to establish the legal authority of the UDHR. More importantly, these cases, by failing to endorse any specific level of authority for the UDHR, leave the door open for further development in this
area.
The legal authority of the Charter and the UDHR is an area of
law in which the United States Supreme Court has remained particularly oblique. The Court has never directly addressed the question of
whether or not any provisions of the Charter are self-executing, although on at least one occasion it had the opportunity to do so.? 5
IV.
A.

SELF-EXECUTING ANALYSIS AND THE HUMAN
RIGHTS PROVISIONS RECONSIDERED

The Present State of the Analysis

As discussed above, the concept of self-executing treaty analysis is
in a state of confusion. The constitutional mandate in article VI is clear
and strong. 2" The seminal cases for the analysis are vague and conflicting. Foster seemed to hold that since the treaty at issue contained
terms of contract, separation of powers considerations indicated that
the legislature and not the judiciary must implement it.247 Percheman
found the same treaty self-executing when a different translation expressed a clearer intent of implementation, even though the separation
of powers considerations remained unchanged. 248 HeadMoney re-emphasized the original constitutional mandate. 24 9
The more modem cases that have applied the analysis to the U.N.
Charter have generally been both unfavorable and less than thorough.
Sei Fuji and its progeny have alleged that the intent of the parties to
the Charter, as manifested by its language, clearly shows it was not
meant to be self-executing. 250 This line of cases focuses on the intent of
the parties and the precision of language used to express that intent.
244. 200 Misc. 124, 101 N.Y.S.2d 461 (Sup. Ct. 1950).
245. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966). In this case the Court upheld the constitutionality of the 1965 Voting Rights Act on 14th amendment grounds, thereby avoiding
the argument that the U.N. Charter required the United States to enact such legislation.
246. See text accompanying note 189 supra.
247. See text accompanying note 194 supra.
248. See text accompanying notes 197-201 supra.
249. See text accompanying note 203 supra.
250. See text accompanying notes 215-17 supra.
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This "intent" analysis is subject to widespread criticism."s Not only is
it a useless tool given the variety of domestic constitutional structures,
but it loses sight of the constitutional bases of the self-execution

doctrine. z 2
The Pauling line of cases suffers from a similar misconception of

self-executing treaty analysis. These cases, while providing little analysis, assume that international law rarely, if ever, vests the individual
with legal character or rights assertable in domestic courts. 253 This
view of international law unduly reflects the statist conceptions of the
nineteenth century. It does injustice to both the strong constitutional
mandate in article VI and the commendable notion in our common law
heritage that treaties and the law of nations be treated as the law of the
land. 4 More importantly, the Pauling view is oblivious to the evolutionary developments in international law recently recognized in
Filarilga.
Unfortunately, the Pauling approach is presently the law. Although the lower courts have developed a number of varying and conflicting versions of self-executing analysis, it does not seem likely that
the Supreme Court will provide any major clarification in the near future. The need for such clarification is enormous, for the present state
of the law not only undermines the rights of litigants in our courts, but
it weakens the United States' role in developing international law, and
impairs its ability to fulfill international obligations. Until such clarification is made, human rights plaintiffs will be forced to continue to
grapple with the doctrine's judicially-created vagaries.
One significant factor has changed since these cases were decided,
however. Fiarigaand Fernandezhave granted the UDHR substantial
legal authority in domestic courts. The interrelation between the Charter and the UDHR is considerable, and the greater legal status of the
latter can lend authority to the former. As the following discussion will
show, this development may be the helping hand with which human
rights advocates can finally push the Charter into self-executing treaty

status.
B. The Basic Criteria
The essence of self-executing treaty analysis is quite intangible..
251. See Schlilter, supra note 220, at 129.
252. Note, IndividualEnforcement of ObligationsArising Underthe UnitedNations Charter, supra note 16, at 200-01.
253. See text accompanying notes 227-30 supra.
254. See text accompanying note 133 supra.
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Considering the serious need for revision of the doctrine, surprisingly
little work is being done on the subject. In the few works addressing
the subject, different authors have maintained that the analysis should
be guided by a variety of very different criteria. One author argued,
seemingly out of desperation, that the basic issue should be "whether
the treaty states a rule complete enough for the courts to follow in determining the rights of the parties. ...

2

Others emphasize the pre-

liminary question of whether the treaty provision even involves legal
before considering whether the obligation is judicially
obligations, 256
enforceable.
Despite the need for fresh insight in this area, the force of precedent greatly diminishes the likelihood that courts will significantly revise the doctrine. Legal arguments will undoubtedly have to address
the same criteria as Fujii, Pauling, and Sa#pan. These cases rely on
three types of considerations: 1) whether the language of the Charter
shows that it was intended to be self-executing; 2) whether the circumstances surrounding its creation evidence such an intent; and
3) whether additional contextual factors and policy considerations indicate such a result. The role of the UDHR in each of these considerations is instructive.
1. The Language of the U.N. Charter
In assessing the self-executing character of a treaty, the language
of the treaty is analyzed for two different purposes. First, it is considered in order to evaluate the basic intent behind the treaty; if the language is ambiguous, circumstances outside the treaty instrument itself
may be considered in gauging intent. Second, the language of the
treaty is examined to determine if it is precise enough to enable a court
to apply it.
Normally, "[t]he courts are to interpret treaties liberally to effect
their purpose, recognizing that a non-implemented treaty which is held
to be not self-executing becomes an unfulfilled international agree'
The cases have not applied the normal liberal standard of
ment."257
treaty interpretation to the Charter, and many scholars agree that if
such an interpretation were applied, the Charter would be seen to involve, at a minimum, a pledge by each member to take action in coop255. Comment, Criteriafor Self-Executing Treaties, 68 U. ILL. L.F. 238, 247-48 (1968).
256. See Schachter, The Charter and the Constitutiorn The Human A'ghts Provisions in
American Law, 4 VAND. L: REv. 643, 646 (1951); Note, supra note 195, at 782.
257. Comment, supra note 255, at 240.
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eration with the Organization to protect human rights.25 8
Some authors25 9 have suggested that the most appropriate standard for interpreting the Charter is the Vienna Convention of the Law
of Treaties. 260 This Convention was adopted in 1969, entered into force
on January 10, 1980, and has been generally held to constitute binding
customary international law. 26 1 Articles 31-33 of the Convention identify accepted rules of interpretation, which, when applied to the Charrights clauses is
ter, suggest "that the obligatory nature of the human
' 262
today outside the realm of serious controversy.
One authority has stated that the Vienna Convention "probably
will have no more effect on the human rights clauses than so-called
263
rules of statutory interpretation have had on the U.S. Bill of Rights.1
The author recommends-that interpreters be governed instead by tfie
UDHR. Recourse to subsequent agreements such as the UDHR is
clearly approved by the Vienna Convention.2 6" While the interpretive
role of the UDHR has in the past been subject to debate,2 65 the arguments in its favor have accumulated with time, and the holdings in
Filarligaand Fernandez add considerably more weight.
Numerous other factors indicate the interpretive role of the
UDHR. When the Charter was being prepared, there was much discussion of the fact that its human rights provisions did not contain very
definitive standards.26 6 Several states argued that this lack of internationally recognized standards relieved them of specific obligations
under the provisions.2 6 7 The California Supreme Court apparently
adopted this argument in Sei Fujii when it held the U.N. Charter to be
258. Wright, supra note 21, at 72-73; Schachter, supra note 256, at 652-53; L. GOODRICH,
E. HAMBRO & A. SIMONS, CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS 381 (3d ed. 1969) [hereinafter
cited as GoODicH]; V. VAN DyKE, supra note 1, at 105-12.
259. See Schlitlter, supra note 220, at 117; Note, supra note 195, at 783-84.
260. Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties, openedforsignature May 23, 1969, U.N.
Doc. A/Conf. 39/27 (1969), 8 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 679 (1969) (entered into force Jan.
10, 1980) [hereinafter cited as Vienna Convention].
261. See Note, supra note 195, at 783 n.60 (citing S. RosENNE, THE LAW OF TRE.TIES
(1970) and Kearney & Dalton, The Treaty on Treaties, 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 495 (1970)). Even
prior to its formal ratification in 1980, the Convention was widely accepted and its prescriptions were generally followed. W. LEvi, CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW: A CONCISE INTRODUCTION 218 (1979).
262. Schlitter, supra note 220, at 126.
263. Newman, Interpreting the Human Rights Clauses of the UN Charter, 5 HUMAN
RIGHTS J. 283, 283 (1972).
264. Vienna Convention, supra note 260, art. 31, para. 3(a).
265. Schltiter, supra note 220, at 144.
266. See Singh, supra note 231, at 184.
267. For example, South Africa made this argument. Id at 184-85.
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executory both because its terms were insufficiently definite and because it contemplated "future legislative action. 2 68 Thus, because the
UDHR is more definitive, it supplies precisely what the U.N. Charter
allegedly lacked.2 69 To use the UDHR in such an interpretive role
would not be a novel approach. A closely analogous precedent was set
in Saipan. In that case, a trusteeship agreement between the U.S. and
the United Nations made pursuant to article 79 of the Charter was held
to be sufficiently detailed to be self-executing.2
2. The Circumstances Surrounding the Creation of the Charter
As noted earlier, the events of the Second World War changed the
conscience of the international community. The protection of human
rights via numerous international treaties became a primary goal.
However, because nations were still largely unwilling to part with their
sovereignty, article 2(7) was made a principal provision of the U.N.
Charter. 271 These two seemingly conflicting provisions-obligation to
protect human rights and freedom from interference with "domestic
jurisdiction"-have been the source of much misdirected debate ever
since.
Two arguments, however, have convinced numerous authorities
that article 2(7) is no obstacle to international consideration of a state's
human rights policies.272 First, article 2(7) forbids only United Nations
intervention, and does not address the question of obligations assumed
as individual states pledge to take separate action.2 73 Second, universal
practice by both states and international bodies show that human rights
are no longer solely within a state's domestic jurisdiction 74
Another line of argument claims that analysis of the Charter's creation shows that the human rights provisions were not intended to be
268. See text accompanying note 217 supra.
269. Singh, supra note 231, at 185.
270. See text accompanying note 242 supra.
271. Article 2(7) states:
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to
intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any
state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the
present Charter, but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.
272. See Note, IndividualEnforcement of Ohligations Arising Under the United Nations
Charter,supra note 16, at 208; Wright, supra note 21, at 74 n.35; Schachter, supra note 256,
at 648; Schltiter, supra note 220, at 120; V. VAN DYKE, supra note 1, at 112-20.
273. Note, IndividualEnforcement of ObligationsArising Under the UnitedNations Charter, supra note 16, at 208.
274. Id See text accompanying note 3 supra.
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self-executing. One scholar has pointed out that the intent of the parties may properly be considered only in assessing the substantive import of the treaty's provisions, not in assessing the intended procedures
for domestic implementation. 5
The circumstances surrounding the Charter's creation reveal some
interesting facts about the intent of the parties. The Charter contains
what has proven to be a troublesome statement: "All members pledge
themselves to takejoint andseparateaction in co-operation with the Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article
55.276 An analysis of the working papers of the San Francisco Conference reveals that this phraseology was a compromise
reached after sev2 77
eral pievious drafts had been objected to.
The Australian delegate originally proposed a clear threefold
pledge: "All Members pledge themselves to take separate and joint action and to cooperate with the Organization and with each other to
achieve these purposes."27 However, the United States delegation,
concerned with intervention into domestic jurisdiction, expressed doubt
concerning the pledge to take separate action. It proposed simply a
pledge to cooperate. Several delegations, including the Australian, objected to this United States proposal, insisting on inclusion of a pledge
to take separate action. The matter was referred to a subcommittee and
the result was the present compromise: the pledge to take separate action was qualified by the phrase "in cooperation with the
Organization."
Several significant points are evident in this history. First, the
drafters specifically rejected a text which merely provided for a pledge
to cooperate with the Organization because they wanted a "separate
action" pledge as well. Second, the concern over having a "separate
action" pledge was that it would allow for United Nations intervention
in domestic affairs.2 79 Lastly, although it was the intent of the United
States in particular to avoid a "separate action" pledge, the American
position was not adopted by the drafters. 280 Thus, recourse to the circumstances surrounding the creation of the Charter, as evidenced in
275. Riesenfeld, The Doctrineof Self-Executing Treaties and US. v. Postak Win at Any
Pice?,74 AM. J. INT'L L. 892, 896-97 (1980).
276. U.N. CHARTER, art. 56 (emphasis added).
277. See GOODRICH, supra note 258, at 380-81; Wright, supra note 21, at 72-73;
Schachter, su.pra note 256, at 649-50.
278. GOODRICH, supra note 258, at 380-81.
279. Schachter, supra note 256, at 650 n.38.
280. Wright, supra note 21, at 73 n.32.
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the working papers, shows that the final intent of the parties was to
require some form of "separate action."
3.

Other Contextual Factors and Policy Considerations

It was previously noted that the Sa~ian court employed a somewhat innovative self-execution test. This test relied on examination of
four "contextual factors," including:
[1] the purposes of the treaty -and the objectives of its creators,
[2] the existence of domestic procedures and institutions appropriate
for direct implementation, [3] the availability and feasibility of alternative enforcement methods, and [4] the immediate and long-range
social consequences of self or non-self-execution. 8 1
This version of self-executing analysis has been hailed as "the
most widely accepted restatement of the doctrine," and "the definitive
modem statement of the doctrine."2 2 While it is true that this 1974
Ninth Circuit case has been cited for its self-executing analysis, 2 3 the
"definitive" status of this analysis does not necessarily follow. While
the Saipan self-executing test represents an admirable attempt at sorely
needed innovation, it, like its predecessors, is easily subject to abuse.
The first factor considered under the Sa~ian test is the purpose of
the treaty and objectives of its creators. It is not clear whether consideration of such purpose and objectives would be limited to an evaluation of the language of the Charter, or whether it would entail an
inherently problematic investigation into the deeper "intent" of the
parties. In any case, a strong argument can be made that the language
of the Charter standing alone is sufficiently obligatory and precise to be
self-executing.
The second Saipan factor is the existence of domestic procedures
and institutions appropriate for direct implementation. This is the one
Sa~pan criterion that appears to remain most true to the constitutional
separation of powers basis for the doctrine. If sufficient procedures and
institutions do not exist, some form of legislative action will likely be
necessary to provide them. This is not the case with the human rights
provisions of the Charter. Our domestic judicial system should be able
281. 502 F.2d 90, 97 (9th Cir. 1974) cert. denied, 420 U.S. 1003 (1974).
282. Note, IndividualEnforcement of ObligationsArising Under the UnitedNations Charter, supra note 16, at 196, 209.
283. See, e.g., Diggs v. Richardson, 555 F.2d 848, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1976); U.S. v. Postal,
589 F.2d 862, 877 (5th Cir. 1979).
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to implement those provisions with little difficulty. 28 4
The third Saipan factor is the availability and feasibility of alternative enforcement methods. This factor is related to the second factor,
and thus may correctly involve the same separation of powers considerations. The existence of an alternative congressional enforcement
mechanism appeared to be a key factor in Justice Marshall's decision in
Foster.285 However, to the extent that this factor involves considerations other than separation of powers, such as recognition of enforcement mechanisms other than in one of the other branches of domestic
government, there appears to be little need for it in self-executing
analysis.
That this third factor is of questionable use was shown in the case
of Diggs v. Richardson.286 In Diggs, the District of Columbia Circuit
Court of Appeals applied the Sai7an criteria to a challenge of the
United States' abrogation of a Security Council Resolution prohibiting
dealings with South Africa. The court found that the Resolution was.
"not addressed to the judicial branch of our government" and did not
"confer rights upon individual citizens,"2' 87 even though the plaintiffs'
only other forum was the Security Council. Thus, this third factor,
rather than being properly based on self-executing analysis, merely
provides a new opportunity for courts to make policy considerations
not properly within their purview.
The fourth and final Saipan factor is the immediate and longrange consequences of self or non-self-execution. It is here that Sai(pan
goes far astray from proper self-executing analysis. This broad factor
can only serve as a very subjective and arbitrary means for the judiciary to evaluate our nation's treaty obligations. Its use would usurp the
role assigned by the Constitution primarily to the executive and legislative branches, and would entirely undermine the separation of powers
basis for the self-executing doctrine. Perhaps the fact that the Saipan
court made no attempt to apply this fourth factor bespeaks its
uselessness.
284. Note, IndividualEnforcementof ObligationsArising Under the UnitedNations Charter, supra note 16, at 211.
285. See text accompanying notes 194-95 supra.
286. 555 F.2d 848 (D.C. Cir. 1976). See also discussion of this case in Note, Individual
Enforcement of ObligationsArising Under the UnitedNations Charter,supra note 16, at 21011.

287. 555 F.2d at 851.
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CONCLUSION

The prospects for the role of the United States government in the
development and promotion of international human rights law in the
near future do not appear bright. Yet, there remains a potentially powerful means whereby United States human rights advocates can advance this cause. The two recent cases of FilartigaandFernandez show
that international human rights law can be accepted as legal authority
in United States courts. Now is the time for human rights attorneys in
the United States to take advantage of these promising signs and push
forward for continued evolution in international human rights law.
A review of self-execution analysis shows that it is in disarray,
largely due to its unsound theoretical foundations. This analysis presently has many variations, most of which bear little relation to the original constitutional underpinnings outlined by Justice Marshall. The
result is that the judiciary has severely circumscribed the international
stance mandated by the United States Constitution.
While revision of self-execution analysis is sorely needed, the various precedents are at present too firmly ensconced to allow much room
for judicial creativity. Thus, human rights advocates will have to continue to base their arguments upon the various analyses currently in
vogue. The interpretive role of the UDHR, and the legal authority
granted it by Filartigaand Fernandez, may be the most crucial factors
in finally making the U.N. Charter self-executing.
In working to advance the status of international human rights
law, human rights advocates will, no doubt, keep several things in
mind. Regrettably, the pace of social development is glacial. When the
various historical, political, and economic factors, combined to produce
the radical new nation known as the United States of America, many
proud ideals were proclaimed to be the law of the land for the first time
in history. One of these ideals was embodied in article VI of the Constitution, establishing treaties as part of the supreme law of the land.
Though much progress has been made, after 200 years our nation is
still struggling to make this a reality.
Similarly, the events that produced the United Nations inspired
many sweeping pronouncements dealing with international law, including articles 55 and 56 of the UN Charter, and the UDHR. The
potential is now before us to achieve great things. We should encourage the United States to live up to its constitutional and international commitments, and to work to further develop international
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human fights law. Surely, such an accomplishment would be of lasting
significance.

